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During the last forty years, economists have devoted a great deal of eﬀort
to developing the concept of human capital and applying it to explain invest-
ment in education, income inequality, and life-time earning proﬁles. Early
contributions to the human capital theory (Schultz 1961, Mushkin 1962,
Becker 1964, Fuchs 1966) suggested that there might exist several forms of
human capital. However, theoretical models of human capital (Becker 1964,
Ben-Porath 1967) modelled it as a one-dimensional stock variable, which was
typically interpreted as education. Even though in the empirical work both
education and experience were usually included in the earning equation (Min-
cer 1997), experience was usually interpreted as a continuation of education
at the job place in the spirit of Ben-Porath’s model.
The concept of health capital was developed by Grossman (1972). Stock
of health in his model determines the total amount of time an individual can
spend producing money earnings and commodities.1 It also directly aﬀects
the utility of the individual. The major drawback of this model is that
in order to explain an empirically observed correlation between education
and the stock of health (Grossman, 1970) one has to assume that education
1For the distinction between market goods and commodities, see Becker (1965).
1increases the eﬃciency with which gross investments in health are produced.
This assumption is not very intuitive and there is no compelling empirical
evidence to support it.
In this paper I propose that a positive correlation between education
and health stock arises from their complementarity in the individual’s utility
function. This complementarity arises due to an insurance motive for health
accumulation, which was largely overlooked in the literature. The basic idea
is that an individual invests in health to increase the probability of survival
in order to enjoy the fruits of the investment in education. Vice versa, a
healthy person will have higher incentives to invest in education, since she is
more likely to survive long enough to enjoy the results.
The insurance motive can explain not only the positive correlation be-
tween education and health, but also a positive correlation between the sav-
ing rate and health. It means that the health status of the population has
an unambiguously positive eﬀect on the growth rate of economy.
A positive causal eﬀect of health on economic growth was reported for
18 Latin American countries by Mayer (2001) and for some of the OECD
countries by Devlin and Hansen (2001). The primary importance of the
health capital for the LDCs was conﬁrmed by McDonald and Roberts (2002).
2This result is of a great potential importance, since it suggests that for these
countries a trade-oﬀ between health enhancing policies and economic growth
need not exist.
Existing theoretical explanations of the connection between health and
productivity (e.g., Fogel 1994, Chang 1996) emphasize the direct eﬀect of
health on the individual’s ability to participate in the production process.
The eﬀects of better health include, for example, an increased ability to
perform complex physical tasks and a decrease in sick hours. They largely
ignore the fact that better health increases the incentives to invest in future
earning capacity. If improved health stimulates more education investment,
part of the eﬀect of an improvement of health status on the rate of economic
growth will be realized with a lag (especially, in poor countries). This implies
that a regression of growth rate on the current health stock will underestimate
the eﬀe c to fh e a l t ho ng r o w t h .
To formalize the insurance motive for health accumulation, I purpose a
life-cycle model of human capital accumulation, in which human capital has
two dimensions: education and health. At each point of their lives credit-
constrained individuals divide their income between consumption, saving,
and investments in health and education. I assume that education aﬀects the
3wage rate, while health determines the probability of survival till the next
period. These assumptions are made not because I believe that individuals
do not value health or health does not aﬀect earning capacity, but because
I am want to isolate the insurance motive for the investment in health and
study its consequences.
I show that if the health level of an individual is high enough her invest-
ment in education is independent of health and she will equate the marginal
product of investment in education with the return to physical assets. This
result is standard in human capital theory. However, for individuals with
poor health, educational investment is positively related with their health.
To get an intuitive understanding of this result note that individuals with
poor health would like to consume as much as possible in the current period,
since they are unlikely to survive till the next one. Hence, the borrowing
constraint will bind. This, in turn, implies that the opportunity cost of the
investment in education will be determined not by the actual interest rate,
but by the eﬀective interest rate equal to the lowest interest that will make
the borrowing constraint slack. This eﬀective interest rate will increase with
the demand for borrowing, which in turn will decrease with probability of
survival and hence, with current health. Hence, the investment in education
4will increase with health.
Even though investment in education for an individual with good health is
independent of the current stock of health, investment in health does depend
on the current stock of education. This will create a positive correlation
between the stocks of health and education across individuals if income eﬀects
are small enough.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I develop a simple two-
period model of optimal investment in physical capital and various forms of
human capital. Section 3 generalizes the model for a life-cycle of indeﬁnite
length. Section 4 concludes.
2 A TWO-PERIOD MODEL
Assume that an individual lives for at most two periods. The preferences
of the individual over a consumption stream (c1,c 2) are given by
U(c1,c 2)=u(c1)+δu(c2), (1)




and δ ∈ (0,1). Assume that the individual is endowed with T units of time
each period, which can be divided between working, schooling, and health
enhancing activities.2 In addition, the investment in health and education
involves monetary resources, qe and qh for a unit of time invested in health and
education, respectively. I also assume that the individual is endowed with e0
units of education and h0 units of health at her birth.3Similar to the model
of Ben-Porath (1967), the education level at the beginning of period two and
health capital at the end of period one are produced using the existing stock
of capital and time. Production technology exhibits decreasing returns to
scale. The wage of the individual is always equal to her education, w = e.
The probability to survive period one is given by a strictly increasing, concave




2We assume that the individual has no preferences for leisure.
3The educational endowment can be interpreted as the innate ability of the individual.
6Finally, the interest rate is equal to r.
Since the individual is always alive in period one and is alive in period
two with probability p(h) her ex-ante expected utility is given by
p(h)(u(c1)+δu(c2)) + (1 − p(h))(u(c1)+δu(D)) (3)
where u(D) is the utility of death.
The individual solves
max[u(c1)+δp(h)(u(c2) − u(D))] (4)
s.t. c1 + s + qeie + qhih = e0(1 − ie − ih) (5)
c2 = s(1 + r)+eT (6)










7Equations (8)-(9) specify production technologies for health and education.
Here di (0 ≤ di ≤ 1) are the depreciation rates of education and health
respectively, and αi and βi are positive constants such that α1 +α2 < 1 and
β1 +β2 < 1. Note that the production of education depends on the stock of
education, but not on the health stock, and vice versa. Again, this is done
not because I believe that the health stock does not aﬀect production of
education, but in order to keep the model as parsimonious as possible.
Deﬁne an imputed utility over period one consumption, savings, health
and education by
W(c1,s,e,h)=u(c1)+δp(h)u(s(1 + r)+eT).
Note that the health and education capital and savings are complements
in the imputed utility function. This implies that if the income eﬀects are
small all these variables move in the same direction in response to a change
in the exogenous parameters of the model.
Let us normalize the initial stock of education, amount of time and mon-
etary costs of investments by
Te0 =1 ,e 0 + qe =1 ,e 0 + qh =1 . (9)
8To proceed further we need some technical assumptions.
Assumption 1 The individuals capacity to borrow is limited, that is there








1 − (α1 + α2)
1 − α2





Assumption 3 There exists such a level of health h∗ that p(h∗)=1 .
Assumption 4 The social discount factor equals the private discount factor
δ =1 /(1 + r).
The last assumption is made for analytical convenience. It will help us to
obtain closed form solutions, but does not alter results signiﬁcantly. To
analyze problem (5)-(9) ﬁrst note that the individual maximizes a continuous
function over a compact set. Hence, a solution exists. Assume that p(·) is
diﬀerentiable for any h diﬀerent from h∗. Then, the following ﬁrst order

















0(h)(u(c2) − u(D)) (12)
λ(s − 1+M)=0 , λ ≥ 0,s ≥ 1 − M. (13)
Here λ is the Lagrange multiplier for a borrowing constraint. The ﬁrst result
I am going to prove is that there is a cutoﬀ level of initial health below which
the borrowing constraint becomes binding.
Proposition 1 The exists a positive level of initial health hmin > 0 such that
for any h0 <h min the borrowing constraint binds.
Proof. From (10) one obtains
λ = u0(c1) − p(h)u0(c2) ≥ u0(M) − p((1 − d2)h0 + h
β1
0 Mβ2)u0((1 − d1)+( 1+
r)(1 − M)).F o r h0 =0one obtains λ ≥ u0(M) > 0. By the continuity of
p(h),t h e r ee x i s t shmin > 0 such that λ > 0 for any h<h min. But then the
complementary slackness condition (13) implies s =1− M.
10If h0 =0the the solution to system (10)-(13) is
c1 = M, c2 =2+r − d1 − (1 + r)M
4,i e = ih =0 . (14)
For small h0 the approximate solution is given by

















Note that if the initial health is small enough, the investment in education
is increasing in the initial stock of health. This means that more healthy
individuals will tend to obtain higher education. Since investment in health
is also increasing in the initial stock of health this will provide a positive cor-
relation between education and health in agreement with Grossman’s results.
Next I will look at education investment when the borrowing constraint





11Hence, investment in education is independent of the initial stock of health
and is determined only by the interest rate and the initial stock of education.
It can be found from the condition that the return to the marginal dollar
invested in education equals the rate of return on the investment in the
physical assets.
So far I obtained investment in education assuming the borrowing con-
straint does not bind. Next, I am going to argue that if the initial health
stock is suﬃciently high this is indeed the case.
Proposition 2 There exists an initial stock of health hmax > 0 such that for
any h0 >h max the borrowing constraint is slack. If the borrowing constraint
is slack investment in education is independent of the initial stock of health
and is given by (19).
Proof. Let h0 be such that (1 − d2)h0 ≥ h∗,w h e r eh∗ is deﬁned in
Assumption 3. Then ih =0 , h =( 1− d2)h0 and p(h)=1 . Assume that



















Assumption 4 ensures that the borrowing constraint is satisﬁed, hence it does
n o tb i n da tt h eo p t i m u m .
Note that since the borrowing constraint is slack at h0 = h∗/(1 − d2) it
will be slack in a open neighborhood of this point. Hence, though perfect
consumption smoothing implies that the borrowing constraint is slack, the
r e v e r s ei sn o tt r u ea n dhmax <h ∗/(1 − d2).
3 A LIFE-CYCLE MODEL
In this section I will extend the model of the previous section assuming
individuals live indeﬁnitely. The value function for an individual with health
13h, education e, and asset holding a is given by




















0 =( 1 + r)(a − ie − ih)+e
0 (23)
ie + ih ≤ 1 (24)






T h et r i p l eo fv a r i a b l e s(e0,h 0,s) are complements in the instantaneous utility
function. This implies that if income eﬀects are small these variables will
move in the same direction in response to a change in an exogenous parameter
of the model. The income eﬀect will be small if income level is big. Since
income increases with education and asset holdings these variables will always
move together for an individual with enough assets or for an individual who
has attained a high enough level of education.

















0(ht)(u(ct+1) − u(D)) (27)
λt(st − et + M)=0 , λt ≥ 0,s t ≥ et − M. (28)
System (25)-(28) to deﬁne policy functions ie(ht,e t,a t), ih(ht,e t,a t), c(ht,e t,a t)
such that
iet = ie(ht,e t,a t), (29)
iht = ih(ht,e t,a t), (30)
ct = c(ht,e t,a t). (31)
One readily obtains propositions similar to Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 The exists a positive level of initial health hmin > 0 such that
5In a two-period this constraint will never bind provided the initial asset holding is zero.
In Ben-Porath (1967) a similar constraint typically binds for some period at the beginning
of life. It happens, because Ben-Porath has a ﬁxed life span and hence the value of
an investment in education decreases with time. This period is usually interpretted as
schooling.
15for any ht <h min the borrowing constraint binds.
Proposition 4 There exists an initial stock of health hmax > 0 such that for
any ht >h max the borrowing constraint is slack. If the borrowing constraint
is slack investment in education is independent on the initial stock of health





The proofs verbatim repeat the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 respec-
tively. At a low level of health the policy functions are approximately given
by

















Note that both iet and iht increase in ht. This generates a positive correla-
tion between health and education. Though the mechanism is very diﬀerent
than the one for high income individuals, the correlation between health and
education in this case is also positive.
16Let us study some dynamics of the model. Assume that e0 > 0 and











ρ − d2h∗) ≤ (2 + r)M. (36)












































−1(µ)) = (2 + r)M. (39)






















Note that when the health level h∗ is reached individuals leave forever
after it. This result can be relaxed in two ways. First, one may assume
that the probability of survival asymptotes to some value smaller then one.
Second, it is possible to introduce aging assuming that the depreciation rate
of health increases with age. In this case it will become eventually too costly
to maintain the health level and the individual will allow it to depreciate.
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I proposed a simple model that allows us to incorporate
health-investment decisions into a life-cycle framework. The complementar-
ity between savings, health, and education is created by an insurance motive
for the accumulation of health. The model predicts a positive correlation
between the health stock, education and savings rate for both high income
countries and poor countries. I showed that investments in education are in-
18dependent of health status for suﬃciently high levels of health and increases
in health if the health status is low.
Assuming that the growth rate of a country is determined by its edu-
cation capital, this result suggests an explanation for the observation that
the growth rates of LDCs are much more sensitive to health status than is
the case for OECD countries. This, in turn, leads to some interesting policy
implications. For example, we are used to think that there is a trade-oﬀ
between economic growth and clean environment. The results of this paper
suggest that for LDCs such a trade-oﬀ need not exist. Indeed, environmental
policy can improve the health status of population, which would result in
higher education investment. The positive eﬀect of an increase of education
investment on growth rates can out-weight the negative direct eﬀect of the
environmental policy.
The model also suggests that the positive correlation between health and
education at high levels of income is due to their complementarity in the in-
dividual’s utility function. It can also be used to study the eﬀect of religious
beliefs, as captured by utility of death, on human capital accumulation. It
can be readily extended to incorporate social risks coming from a poor en-
vironment or crime. One has only to replace p(h) by q(h)=q∗p(h) where
19q∗ ≤ 1 is a measure of social risk.
The most important drawback of the model is that is does not allow
for aging. Even though it can be done in a straightforward way discussed
above, a model becomes much less tractable. Introducing aging in a tractable
way represents a considerable challenge, however, I believe that the main
conclusions of the paper will survive such an extension.
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